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Abstract: 
This capstone examines if leaders mattered during the time of COVID-19.  I analyzed 
this by examining the effect of the stringency of leaders’ policies on total cases and deaths per 
million from COVID-19.  This initial analysis found that a decrease in the stringency index was 
associated with increases in both cases and deaths.  Next, I ran additional statistical analyses 
examining if leaders had an effect on COVID-19 outcomes independent of the economic 
situation, health infrastructure, and cultural norms of their respective countries.  It was found that 
the stringency of leaders’ policies still had an effect on cases and deaths independent of these 
factors.  Lastly, I examined countries that experienced a change in their head of state during 2020 
by comparing changes in the stringency of leaders’ policies before and after the leadership 
change occurred.  Three out of the five countries analyzed appeared to have a change in the 
stringency index after the leadership change occurred.  Ultimately, I concluded that leaders did 
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Introduction: 
COVID-19 drastically changed the world in only a few short months.  The world 
economy has essentially shut down for an indefinite period of time in hopes of “flattening the 
curve” and saving lives.  Political leaders have handled this situation in a variety of different 
ways with varying degrees of apparent success.  It is my aim to study the effects of these varying 
responses and to better understand how leaders’ responses are shaped by cultural values and 
economic institutions.  To the extent cultural values and economic institutions greatly constrain 
leaders’ choices and their efficacy, we should critically examine just how much leadership 
matters. 
COVID-19 is believed to have had an animal origin, possibly in fruit bats, and first 
spread to humans sometime in late 2019 (WHO, 2020).  The first confirmed cases were reported 
in Wuhan, China in January of 2020 (WHO, 2020).  From China, the disease first spread to 
neighboring countries such as Vietnam.  In February, Italy reported its first case and quickly 
overtook China as the country with the most deaths (WHO, 2020).  Shortly afterwards, COVID-
19 began to spread in Europe and then in North America, South America, Africa, and Oceania.  
The World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a pandemic in March (WHO, 2020).  As of 
April, the US leads the world in the total number of cases and deaths (WHO, 2020).  The 
pandemic is still raging in the world, even in countries that were initially able to contain it 
(WHO, 2020).  As cooler weather returns, public health experts are increasingly worried that 
cases will spike due to people interacting more indoors with poor ventilation, allowing the virus 
to spread (Mallapaty, 2020). 
We have never encountered a rapid-spreading communicable disease that has infected 
nearly every country and island in the modern industrialized era.  One of the reasons for COVID-
 Pett 7 
19’s spread and the difficulty in containing it is the ease of air travel, both domestic and 
international.  Thousands of people take international flights every day, allowing diseases to 
enter new countries before passengers even show symptoms due to COVID-19’s longer latency 
period which can range from a few days to two weeks (CDC, 2020a; Tatem et al., 2006).  
Another reason for COVID-19’s rapid spread is the fact that more people than ever before are 
living in cities, and population growth has been exponential in recent decades (Roser et al., 
2013).  This urbanization has increased so rapidly in recent years that governments have been 
unable to ensure safe housing for their citizens in countries such as India, South Africa, and 
Pakistan, among many others (The Borgen Project, 2017).  Overcrowded, unhealthy, and unsafe 
slums have developed as a result.  Diseases are able to spread with relative ease in these densely 
populated communities where space constraints make people unable to socially distance (Patel & 
Burke, 2009).  Additionally, people living in these slums often have high rates of pre-existing 
conditions such as asthma due to pollution, and these conditions can increase the risk of 
mortality from COVID-19 (Corburn et al., 2020). 
Leadership policies during times of epidemics and pandemics have culturally evolved 
over time.  Quarantine was first implemented in 1377 to combat the Black Death after doctors 
began observing the time between infection and onset of symptoms (Huremović, 2019).  They 
realized that if people had been in contact with others who had become infected, it was likely 
only a matter of days before they too would become infected.  Quarantine was utilized to prevent 
people from infecting others during this latency period (Huremović, 2019).  Quarantine is still 
used today, especially to prevent people who have potentially been infected with COVID-19 
from infecting others.  During the 1918 Flu, the deadliest pandemic in the modern industrialized 
era, strict policy measures were put in place to limit the spread of the disease.  Specifically, in 
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the US, countries in Europe, and countries in Asia, schools and workplaces were closed, public 
events were cancelled, gatherings were restricted, people were ordered to stay at home, and 
masks were required to be worn (Huremović, 2019).  Since this pandemic happened during a 
war, it was easier for the government to order people to act in certain ways that limited their 
freedoms.  This is because people are generally more willing to accept coercive measures, prefer 
dominant leaders, and cooperate more for the collective benefit of the group during wartime 
(Bauer et al., 2016; Laustsen & Petersen, 2017).  During COVID-19, many of these same 
policies has been enacted, yet debates have sprung up in some nations regarding government 
paternalism.  Specifically, in the US, citizens have protested that mask mandates interfere with 
people’s individual freedom to make decisions for their own health (Stewart, 2020).  Another 
policy for containing outbreaks is that of limiting both domestic and international travel.  This 
was utilized as a principal strategy during the SARS pandemic of 2003 to contain the high-
fatality disease that could be easily spread through air travel in the modern era (Huremović, 
2019).  Similarly, restricting both domestic and international travel has been a policy choice of 
most leaders during COVID-19 (Nomads, 2020).   
COVID-19 has created a unique opportunity to study effective leadership.  The choices 
that leaders make now can have far-reaching economic and health consequences for not only 
their citizens, but also humanity as a whole.  This makes fragmented policies problematic, as 
COVID-19 has demonstrated that diseases do not respect borders.  Leaders can only control their 
country’s policies, but their effectiveness is limited by the situation of border countries.  While 
leaders’ policies at this time are critically important, their effectiveness is likely to be influenced 
or confounded by the existing economic and healthcare institutions as well as the cultural norms 
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of their country.  It is crucial to account for these factors when assessing the importance of 
leadership at this time. 
Despite the vast literature on leadership in the social sciences, there is relatively little 
research evaluating whether particular leaders matter, independent of contextual or structural 
determinants of leaders’ decision-making or independent of effects of context or structural forces 
on targets of leaders’ policymaking.  Weber (1947) contends that individual leaders may play a 
significant role in shaping their country’s affairs but also acknowledges that social norms, 
institutions, and historical forces play large or even larger roles (1947).  Military historian John 
Keegan (2003) argues that a select number of individual leaders have been the key to military 
outcomes in the modern era and have had a substantial influence on modern history.  He claims 
that different leaders would have led to drastically different war outcomes.  Jervis (2013), in 
contrast, acknowledges that leaders may matter but their policies are greatly influenced by public 
opinion and historical circumstances. Jones and Olken (2005) employ a more quantitative, less 
subjective approach to show that individual leaders, historically, have mattered in terms of 
increasing economic growth independent of other historical, economic, and cultural forces acting 
on them and their societies.  They found that leaders have been able to greatly affect policy 
outcomes in ways not predicted by these historical, economic, and cultural forces and, thus, are 
able to play significant roles in shaping the growth of nations.  Debate continues regarding 
whether individual political leaders matter independent of cultural norms and historical and 
economic forces. 
I will evaluate whether leaders matter in terms of policy efficacy during the COVID-19 
pandemic.  Leaders were forced to experiment with implementing some policies that had never 
been proven effective before, such as mask mandates.  Their choices have had implications for 
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not only the health of their citizens, but the health of the global population.  The main policy 
choices that I am evaluating in this thesis are school closures, workplace closures, cancelling 
public events, restricting gatherings, closing public transport, conducting public information 
campaigns, issuing stay at home orders, restricting internal movement, and restricting 
international travel.  These have been the main policy choices that executive leaders have chosen 
to implement, and their usage has been well-documented by researchers.  I am evaluating 
executive policy among heads of state, but it is important to note that countries’ policies may 
also reflect leadership in legislative or other political domains.  It is difficult to create a measure 
that fully captures the heterogeneity in policy measures, but the stringency index that I will be 
using is a composite score of these policy choices and accounts for some degree of heterogeneity 
through the unique coding system.   
 In terms of COVID-19, leaders were constrained in terms of their policy choices by 
economics and by the health infrastructure in their countries.  Lower-income countries have been 
less able to curtain in-person commerce or shut their borders (Rouzier et al., 2020).  If their 
leaders had imposed strict lockdowns, people could have died of starvation from lack of access 
to resources.  Additionally, leaders may not have been able to implement measures to increase 
testing capacity or mandate the wearing of face masks if they do not have the means to provide 
funding for testing or if their citizens cannot afford masks.  In addition, Arnot et al (2020) 
suggest that countries with more poverty or more inequality may have populations that are more 
future-discounting, because of the way human psychology responds to scarcity by prioritizing 
current needs over future benefits.  This behavior can decrease compliance with COVID-19 
policies, which can increase exposure and mortality risk.  
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Cultural variation in norms may also contribute to policy choice and to COVID-19 
outcomes, independent of policy choice.  Individualistic cultures stress the needs of the 
individual over the group.  People in individualistic cultures are viewed as unique, and social 
behavior is dictated by the preferences of individuals (Hogan, 2019).  Individualism is common 
in North American and Western European cultures.  Collectivism represents the opposite values, 
and people in these cultures place a greater emphasis on duty to others, especially one’s family.  
The goals of the group are more important than an individual’s desires.  Collectivism is common, 
for example, in East Asian and South Asian countries.  Muthukrishna and Schaller (2020) found 
that collectivistic cultures are more prone to rapid transformation due to them having a greater 
susceptibility to social influence.  In the case of COVID-19, this could mean that collectivistic 
cultures are better able to transform their daily routines to halt the spread of the disease. 
Collectivist cultures have also been shown to exhibit higher rates of xenophobia in response to 
threat, and this has a protective effect against diseases (Kim et al., 2016).   
Another measure of cultural variation is a tightness vs. looseness spectrum.  Tight 
cultures strongly emphasize social norms and compliance with them, whereas loose cultures 
have much weaker social norms (Gelfand et al., 2011).  This is related to the perception of threat 
in that tighter cultures have historically tended to experience more threat in the form of natural 
disasters, pathogens, wars, etc. People in looser cultures have historically experienced less 
threats, and they may be more likely to underestimate the risk of COVID-19, at least initially, 
thus allowing it to spread before taking action.   
Democratic values are another cultural factor that may influence countries’ policies.  
Glezos (2013) found that countries that have more authoritarian leadership, as opposed to more 
democratic leadership, are able to enact more stringent policies in general.  In addition, countries 
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with more authoritarian leadership may be able to respond to the pandemic more rapidly, since 
there may be fewer differences in opinion in government to accommodate over the course of 
policy debate and the head of state has more coercive power.  This swiftness could possibly 
decrease cases and deaths from COVID-19 since policies can be enacted quickly to respond to 
the rapidly changing circumstances of the pandemic.  Conversely, less democratic countries may 
also be more subject to the whims of the authoritarian head of state.  This could have important 
implications for COVID-19 policies.  Specifically, a more authoritarian leader could choose to 
implement policies that oppose recommendations from the scientific community.   
 This thesis will examine the importance of executive leaders’ policy choices during the 
time of COVID-19.  To analyze this, I will begin in Chapter Two by assessing the stringency of 
leaders’ responses and the effect that this had on cases and deaths in their respective countries.  
In Chapter Three, I will then factor in each country’s economic status and health infrastructure to 
analyze whether they predict leaders’ policies, and whether the latter matters independent of 
effects of economics and health infrastructure on cases and deaths due to COVID-19.  Next, in 
Chapter Four, I will assess effects of measures of cultural norms and democratic values on 
leaders’ pandemic policy, and I will test whether leaders’ policies matter independent of their 
country’s cultural norms and values.  I will end in Chapter Five by analyzing countries that have 
experienced leadership changes in 2020.  If leadership transitions aren’t also accompanied by 
much change in economic indicators or cultural values, we can better ascertain the unique effect 
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General Methods: 
I use longitudinal data on the stringency of countries’ COVID-19 policy, total cases per 
million, and total deaths per million. This data was obtained from Our World in Data, which is 
based at the University of Oxford and compiles data from the European CDC (Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) Deaths - Statistics and Research, 2021).  The European CDC data is compiled 
using countries’ local health department as well as government-reported data.   
 The government stringency index I analyze is a composite score of nine response metrics: 
school closures; workplace closures; cancellation of public events; restrictions on public 
gatherings; closures of public transport; stay-at-home requirements; public information 
campaigns; restrictions on internal movements; and international travel controls.  This index is 
created by researchers at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government (Petherick 
et al., 2020).  This composite measure is calculated for each country every day and is a simple 
additive score of nine indicators measured on an ordinal scale, rescaled to vary from 0 to 100.  If 
a country has different responses at local levels, the strictest region’s measure is used.  The 
researchers note that very few countries have allowed local leaders to make executive COVID-
19 policy decisions, with the exceptions including the US, UK, and Brazil (Petherick et al., 
2020).  Thus, this measure is generally reflective of national leadership response.  This score is 
standardized and has already been utilized by researchers to study policy responses to COVID-
19, making it an effective tool for cross-country comparison.  A more detailed description of the 
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Name of Policy Response Coding of Policy Response 
School closures 0 - No measures 
1 - Recommend closing 
2 - Require closing (only some levels or categories, e.g. just high school, or 
just public schools) 
3 - Require closing all levels 
Workplace closures 0 - No measures 
1 - Recommend closing (or work from home) 
2 - Require closing (or work from home) for some sectors or categories of 
workers 
3 - Require closing (or work from home) all but essential workplaces (e.g. 
grocery stores, doctors) 
Cancel public events 0 - No measures 
1 - Recommend cancelling 
2 - Require cancelling 
Restrictions on gatherings 0 - No restrictions 
1 - Restrictions on very large gatherings (the limit is above 1000 people) 
2 - Restrictions on gatherings between 100-1000 people 
3 - Restrictions on gatherings between 10-100 people 
4 - Restrictions on gatherings of less than 10 people 
Close public transport 0 - No measures 
1 - Recommend closing (or significantly reduce volume/route/means of 
transport available) 
2 - Require closing (or prohibit most citizens from using it) 
Public information campaigns 0 - No COVID-19 public information campaign 
1 - Public officials urging caution about COVID-19 
2 - Coordinated public information campaign (e.g. across traditional and 
social media) 
Stay at home 0 - No measures 
1 - Recommend not leaving house 
2 - Require not leaving house with exceptions for daily exercise, grocery 
shopping, and ‘essential’ trips 
3 - Require not leaving house with minimal exceptions (e.g. allowed to 
leave only once every few days, or only one person can leave at a time, 
etc.) 
Restrictions on internal movement 0 - No measures 
1 - Recommend movement restriction 
2 - Restrict movement 
International travel controls 0 - No measures 
1 - Screening 
2 - Quarantine arrivals from high-risk regions 
3 - Ban on high-risk regions 
4 - Total border closure 
 
Table 1: Coding system for the nine government policy responses that make up the stringency index. 
 
The models I test include a date variable, which was created by assigning “Day 1” to the 
first day that each individual country reached 50 total cases.  All data before the country reached 
50 total cases was excluded from the analyses.  This data cleaning allowed for more meaningful 
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analyses that were not full of zeroes since the dataset began for every country on December 31st, 
2019.  Most countries did not see their first case until February or March, skewing the dataset 
toward zero.  The date variable was then squared to account for quadratic effects.  The changing 
number of deaths and cases over time is not likely to be linear, but it is likely to have some 
polynomial effect that a quadratic function is better able to fit.  The dataset contains data from 
day one until October 4th, 2020, with the exception of Chapter 5 which contains data until 
December 31st, 2020. 
Total COVID-19 tests per thousand people was included in each model of cases and 
deaths as a potential confounding variable.  Wealthier countries may also be more likely to 
afford more testing per capita, which could introduce bias into estimates of cases.  However, 
research suggests that once a threshold of about two daily tests per thousand people is reached, 
an increase in testing does not appear to significantly increase reported cases (Begley, 2020).  
Given this, testing was still included as a confounding variable since it is still likely that greater 
testing, to some extent, will find more cases and deaths from COVID-19.  The data for total tests 
per thousand was obtained from Our World in Data which uses government-reported data in 
addition to data collected by the World Bank and is updated daily (Coronavirus (COVID-19) 
Deaths - Statistics and Research, 2021).   
Twelve countries that did not have data for stringency indices were excluded from the 
analyses since that is the main variable of interest.  Additionally, three small countries that did 
not experience any deaths were excluded from the analyses, since this was likely due to them not 
experiencing slightly more than 50 cases, limiting the data to only a few days for each of the 
three countries.  
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SAS was used to perform all statistical analyses.  GEE linear models were run with the 
dependent variables being total cases per million in each country and total deaths per million in 
each country.  The stringency index was included as a dependent variable in Chapter 3 and 4.  
The GEE model was chosen because it is able to fit repeated categorical observations by country 
and can account for correlated errors within countries when creating model estimates.  COVID-
19 case and death data are correlated and clustered within countries, so the GEE models treat 
country as a random component.  This increases the validity of standard error estimation.  An 
exchangeable correlation structure that assumes similar covariance among variables from the 
same country was specified.  An unstructured correlation structure was rejected because it 
produced substantially worse model fit based on quasi-likelihood information criterion (QIC).  
Because the dependent variables were distributed non-normally and represent count data, a 
negative binomial with a log link function was chosen to model the effects of the covariates on 
the dependent variables.  Additionally, variance inflation factor analyses were run for each 
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Introduction: 
COVID-19 has created a unique opportunity to examine if individual leaders and their 
policies matter independent of economic and cultural constraints.  Existing research provides a 
mixed review of the importance of leadership, with some scholars finding that leaders have 
mattered in terms of economic and military policy, whereas others have found that individual 
leaders and their policies are largely constrained and influenced by economic, historical, and 
cultural factors (Jervis, 2013; Jones & Olken, 2005; Keegan, 2003; Weber, 1947).  Leaders 
across the world have been experimenting with policies with varying degrees of stringency and, 
often, vastly different outcomes.  Regarding possible confounding variables, a higher population 
and population density have been correlated with communicable disease spread (Patel & Burke, 
2009).  The CDC has claimed that people with diabetes are at an increased risk of severe illness 
and death from COVID-19, so diabetes prevalence was included as a covariate to account for this 
(CDC, 2020c).  Similarly, elderly people are at a higher risk for severe illness and death from 
COVID-19, so the percent of the population over age 65 for each country has been included as 
well (CDC, 2020b).  In this section, I will be assessing the stringency of leaders’ responses and 
the effect that this had on cases and deaths in their respective countries.   
 
Prediction: 
 I predict that both the stringency index and the other variables will affect the total cases 
and deaths per million.  Based on the existing literature, I expect the stringency index to be 
negatively associated with cases and deaths.  Conversely, I expect the variables of population, 
population density, percent of the population over age 65, diabetes prevalence, total tests per 
thousand, and date to be positively associated with cases and deaths. 
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Methods: 
In multivariate GEE models of COVID-19 cases and deaths, I test the following 
covariates: stringency index, population, population density, percent of the population over age 
65, diabetes prevalence, total tests per thousand, and date.  These covariates were selected based 
off of existing research on their effects on COVID-19 and other epidemics and pandemics. 
The data for population, population density, percent of the population over age 65, and 
diabetes prevalence was obtained from Our World in Data which uses government-reported data 
(Coronavirus (COVID-19) Deaths - Statistics and Research, 2021). 
 
Results: 
 180 countries were included in the GEE analyses after excluding those with limited or 
missing data and those whose total cases did not reach 50.  Collinearity was only found between 
the two date variables, which is to be expected (see Appendix).  For the analysis with total cases 
per million as the outcome variable, the variables of stringency index, population, percent of the 
population aged 65 and older, diabetes prevalence, total tests per thousand, and date were all 
significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 2).  Only population density was not significant at the 
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Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept -2.3924 0.3951 -3.0898 -1.6849 -4.63 <0.0001 
Stringency 
Index 
-0.0217 0.0027 -0.0269 -0.0163 -11.69 <0.0001 
Population -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -3.03 0.0025 
Population 




0.0781 0.0163 0.0453 0.1101 4.73 <0.0001 
Diabetes 
Prevalence 
0.0874 0.0315 0.0257 0.1488 2.78 0.0054 
Total Tests 
Per Thousand 
0.0804 0.0218 0.0374 0.1287 3.12 0.0018 
New Date 
Squared -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -10.45 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0507 0.0028 0.0452 0.0561 17.88 <0.0001 
 
Table 2: GEE results for total cases per million with stringency index, population, population density, percent of the 
population aged 65 and older, diabetes prevalence, total tests per thousand, and date as independent variables. 
 
For the analysis with total deaths per million as the outcome variable, stringency index, 
population, population density, percent of the population aged 65 and older, total tests per 
thousand, and date were all significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 3).  Only diabetes prevalence 













Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept -2.5261 0.5246 -3.5539 -1.4965 -4.83 <0.0001 
Stringency 
Index -0.0219 0.0038 -0.0282 -0.0171 -11.89 <0.0001 
Population -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -3.17 0.0015 
Population 
Density 




0.1409 0.0158 0.1084 0.1716 8.76 <0.0001 
Diabetes 
Prevalence 0.0409 0.0266 -0.0112 0.0931 1.54 0.1236 
Total Tests 
Per Thousand 
0.0889 0.0211 0.0382 0.1296 3.15 0.0016 
New Date 
Squared 
-0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -8.26 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0487 0.0041 0.0408 0.0567 11.82 <0.0001 
 
Table 3: GEE results for total deaths per million with stringency index, population, population density, percent of 
the population aged 65 and older, diabetes prevalence, total tests per thousand, and date as independent variables. 
 
A 0.02 unit increase in total cases and deaths per million was associated with a one unit 
decrease in the stringency index.  The effect of population was negligible for both cases and 
deaths even though it was statistically significant.  The effect of population density was 
negligible for cases, and an increase of 0.0005 deaths per million was associated with a one unit 
decrease in population density.  An increase of 0.08 cases per million was associated with a 1% 
increase in the population over age 65.  Relatedly, an increase of 0.14 deaths per million was 
associated with a 1% increase in the population over age 65.  An increase of 0.09 cases per 
million was associated with a 1% increase in diabetes prevalence.  An increase of 0.04 deaths per 
million was associated with a 1% increase in diabetes prevalence, but this finding was not 
statistically significant.  An increase of 0.09 deaths per million was associated with an increase 
of one test per thousand.  The squared date variable shows a negligible effect for both cases and 
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deaths even though it was statistically significant.  A 0.05 unit increase in total cases and deaths 
per million was associated with an increase of one day from day zero. 
 
Discussion: 
 The results indicate that a higher stringency index is associated with both lower cases and 
deaths.  This makes sense, given that stricter restrictions would limit how much contact people 
are able to have with one another, and in the event of social proximity the likelihood of viral 
transmission.  This data demonstrates that strict responses are effective in reducing the spread of 
COVID-19 and, thus, reducing mortality from it as well.  This data seems to correlate with CDC 
and WHO reports of effective measures for preventing COVID-19 infection.  The data also 
seems to correlate with reports of which countries have had tremendous success in fighting 
COVID-19.  Taiwan, Vietnam, and Hong Kong, for example, implemented very strict measures 
and had relatively low numbers of both cases and deaths (Lam et al., 2020; Ng et al., 2020; 
Trevisan et al., 2020).  Brazil and Sweden implemented far less strict measures and faced large 
number of cases and deaths from COVID-19 (Lotta et al., 2020; Pierre, 2020).   
Interestingly, the results also indicate that a smaller population is associated with more 
cases and deaths.  A lower population density is associated with more deaths, but this effect is 
not discernable for cases.  It is possible that there are some outliers greatly affecting these 
population results, such as the US with its relatively low population density but very high 
number of deaths.  Having a larger percentage of the population over age 65 is associated with 
more cases and deaths, which makes sense given that COVID-19 spread rapidly through many 
nursing homes and claimed many lives due to the elderly’s high rates of pre-existing conditions 
(CDC, 2020b).  Higher diabetes prevalence is associated with more cases, but not more deaths.  
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This finding is interesting and seems to contradict CDC recommendations that claim diabetes is a 
risk factor for severe complications or death from COVID-19.  However, Holman et al (2020) 
conducted a cohort study in England and found that the increased mortality among people with 
diabetes is possibly confounded by other variables such as body mass index, cardiovascular 
disease, hypertension, and glycemic control.  Additionally, many of the diabetes studies have 
been conducted in the US and Europe, and it is possible that this effect is not seen in the rest of 
the world. 
The results show that stringency index has a similar effect on the numbers of both cases 
and deaths within countries.  The effect of age is much larger for deaths than for cases.  This 
makes sense given that a higher age does not make people more susceptible to COVID-19, with 
the exception of the nursing homes that became hotspots, but it does increase mortality risk 
(CDC, 2020b).  Population density, interestingly, has a much smaller effect for cases than for 
deaths.  The existing research for population density is mixed, with one US-based study showing 
no effect between population density and COVID-19 cases and deaths and another India-based 
study showing a moderate effect between population density and cases and deaths (Bhadra et al., 
2020; Hamidi et al., 2020).  It is possible that, when analyzing 165 countries, the effect of 
population density on deaths could be due to higher poverty concentrations and rates of pre-
existing conditions in more dense areas in the developing world that have yet to be fully studied.  
Population has a negligible effect and appears to be similar for both cases and deaths.  Diabetes 
prevalence has a larger effect on cases than on deaths.  As discussed above, researchers have 
found that the association between diabetes and COVID-19 mortality could be confounded by 
other variables (Holman et al., 2020).  Additionally, an increase in testing was found to be 
associated with more cases and deaths with a slightly greater effect on deaths.  This makes sense 
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given that some countries had very limited testing capacity and were unable to properly diagnose 
cases and deaths, whereas countries that had greater testing capacity were able to test even 
asymptomatic people and find additional cases.  The results also demonstrate that COVID-19 has 
increased in both cases and deaths over time, and this aligns with the nature of the pandemic. 
These analyses seem to provide support for the idea that leaders and their policies have 
had an effect on COVID-19 outcomes and, thus, matter.  The next chapter will incorporate 
economic and health infrastructure factors into the analysis to ascertain whether leaders and their 
policies matter, independent of the poverty, economic productivity, extent of economic 
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Introduction: 
During COVID-19, leaders were constrained by the existing economic resources and 
healthcare institutions in their countries, limiting their policy choices and possibly impacting the 
number of cases and deaths in their countries.  Prior research has found that countries with high 
extreme poverty rates and lower GDP per capita have been unable to be as strict as high-income 
countries during COVID-19 since they are unable to completely shut down their economies and 
risk a large portion of their population falling into extreme poverty and starving (Bargain & 
Aminjonov, 2020; Rouzier et al., 2020).  This increase in cases is also likely to increase deaths.  
In addition, countries’ degree of poverty or wealth inequality can trigger changes in psychology 
for those who experience scarcity or self-assess as low status relative to others (Novotney, 2014). 
Such psychological changes may affect behavior that increases risk of COVID infection and 
transmission, including discounting the future and taking more risks (Arnot et al., 2020).  In 
addition, lower income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient associates with lower 
COVID-19 mortality and cases possibly due to lower levels of corruption in the flow of goods 
and services within a nation (Chaudhry et al., 2020).   
Health infrastructure that may associate with COVID-19 cases and mortality include 
availability of handwashing facilities, hospital capacity, and scale of testing.  The WHO has 
found handwashing to be important for preventing the spread of COVID-19, and other studies 
have found that a lack of handwashing facilities correlates with higher cases and mortality 
(Brauer et al., 2020; Handwashing an Effective Tool to Prevent COVID-19, Other Diseases, 
2020).  It has been shown in European countries that less hospital beds were associated with an 
increase in deaths since countries with little healthcare infrastructure typically have less 
resources to treat severe symptoms of COVID-19 (Barrera-Algarín et al., 2020).  In this chapter, 
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I will be analyzing economic measures and health infrastructure to see if these factors impacted 
the stringency index or the number of cases and deaths in their countries. 
 
Predictions: 
 I predict that the economic and health infrastructure variables will affect the stringency of 
leaders’ policies.  More specifically, I expect the variables of extreme poverty and Gini 
coefficient to be negatively associated with the stringency index.  Conversely, I expect the 
variables of GDP per capita, the number of handwashing facilities, and the number of hospital 
beds per thousand, and total tests per thousand to be positively associated with the stringency 
index.  I also predict that these economic variables will affect total cases and deaths per million, 
independent of the stringency index.  Based on the existing literature, I expect the variables of 
GDP per capita, the number of handwashing facilities, the number of hospital beds per thousand, 
and total tests per thousand to be negatively associated with cases and deaths.  I expect the 




Chapter Three uses the following new independent variables: extreme poverty, Gini 
coefficient, handwashing facilities, hospital beds per thousand citizens, GDP per capita, and total 
COVID-19 tests per thousand.  The data for extreme poverty, handwashing facilities, hospital 
beds per thousand, and GDP per capita was obtained from Our World in Data which uses 
government-reported data in addition to data collected by the World Bank (Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) Deaths - Statistics and Research, 2021).  Data for Gini coefficients were collected 
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directly from the World Bank website (Gini Index (World Bank Estimate) | Data, 2020).  Data 
for extreme poverty, handwashing facilities, GDP per capita, and Gini coefficient were from 
2017.  Data for hospital beds per thousand people was from 2018.  It is important to note that 
most of the economic variables I have included predate COVID-19 by a year or more.  More 
recent data has not yet been published for these variables, but it is still a limitation of my study 
that the data is not all from the same year.  It is possible that these variables could change quite a 
bit over a few years for certain countries.  It is also possible that some of these variables may 
have changed during COVID-19, as this pandemic has generally hurt the world economy (El 
Keshky et al., 2020). 
Extreme poverty in this case is defined as the percentage of a country’s population living 
on less than $1.90 per day.  Gini coefficient is a widely used measure of statistical dispersion 
designed to represent wealth inequality in a nation, ranging from zero (perfect equality-everyone 
receives an equal share) to 100 (perfect inequality-one recipient or group receives all the 
income).  The handwashing facilities variable in this instance is defined as the percentage of a 
country’s population with access to basic handwashing facilities.  Access to basic handwashing 
facilities refers to a device, either fixed or mobile, to facilitate handwashing with soap and water 
available on the premises.  These covariates were selected based off of existing research on their 




The same 180 countries as the previous chapter were included in the GEE analyses.  
Collinearity was only found between the two date variables, which is to be expected (see 
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Appendix).  For the analysis with stringency index as the outcome variable, only the variables of 
extreme poverty and date were significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 4).  A 0.0052 unit decrease 
in the stringency index was associated with a 1% increase in the population living in extreme 
poverty.  The squared date variable showed a negligible effect even though it was statistically 
significant.  A 0.005 unit increase in the stringency index was associated with an increase of 1 
day from day zero. 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 4.6344 0.2174 4.2082 5.0606 21.31 <0.0001 
Extreme Poverty -0.0052 0.0019 -0.0090 -0.0014 -2.71 0.0067 
Gini Coefficient -0.0026 0.0045 -0.0114 0.0062 -0.57 0.5662 
Handwashing 
Facilities 0.0010 0.0017 -0.0024 0.0044 0.56 0.5774 
Hospital Beds 
Per Thousand 
0.0317 0.0389 -0.0446 0.1080 0.81 0.4153 
GDP Per Capita -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -1.54 0.1234 
Total Tests Per 
Thousand 
0.0010 0.0008 -0.0005 0.0025 1.36 0.1724 
New Date 
Squared -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -2.41 0.0161 
New Date 0.0052 0.0009 0.0041 0.0063 1.74 0.0409 
 
Table 4: GEE results for stringency index with extreme poverty, Gini coefficient, handwashing facilities, hospital 
beds per thousand, GDP per capita, total tests per thousand, and date as independent variables. 
 
For the analysis with total cases per million as the outcome variable, stringency index, 
Gini coefficient, hospital beds per thousand, GDP per capita, total tests per thousand, and date 
were all significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 5).  Only extreme poverty and handwashing 
facilities were not significant at the p=0.05 level.  A decrease of 0.02 cases per million was 
associated with a one unit increase in the stringency index.  Additionally, an increase of 0.2 cases 
per million was associated with a one unit increase in the Gini coefficient.  A decrease of 0.4 
cases per million was found to be associated with an increase of one hospital bed per thousand.  
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The effect size of GDP per capita was negligible even though it was significant, with an increase 
of 0.0002 cases per million being associated with a one unit increase in GDP per capita.  An 
increase of 0.01 cases per million was associated with an increase of one total test per thousand.  
The squared date variable showed a negligible effect for cases even though it was statistically 
significant.  An increase of 0.06 cases per million was associated with an increase of one day 
from day zero. 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 0.3293 0.7431 -1.1272 1.7859 0.44 0.6576 
Stringency Index -0.0236 0.0046 -0.0326 -0.0145 -5.12 <0.0001 
Extreme Poverty -0.0056 0.0118 -0.0287 0.0175 -0.47 0.6367 
Gini Coefficient 0.2032 0.0386 0.1293 0.2771 3.28 <0.0001 
Handwashing 
Facilities -0.0139 0.0100 -0.0335 0.0057 -1.39 0.1632 
Hospital Beds 
Per Thousand 
-0.4035 0.1464 -0.6905 -0.1164 -2.76 0.0059 
GDP Per Capita 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 3.97 <0.0001 
Total Tests Per 
Thousand 0.0127 0.0046 0.0036 0.0218 2.73 0.0064 
New Date 
Squared -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -10.11 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0617 0.0028 0.0563 0.0671 22.42 <0.0001 
 
Table 5: GEE results for total cases per million with stringency index, extreme poverty, Gini coefficient, 
handwashing facilities, hospital beds per thousand, GDP per capita, total tests per thousand, and date as independent 
variables. 
 
For the analysis with total deaths per million as the outcome variable, all variables were 
significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 6).  A decrease of 0.03 deaths per million was associated 
with a one unit increase in the stringency index.  It was also found that a decrease of 0.04 deaths 
per million was associated with a 1% increase in the population living in extreme poverty.  
Additionally, an increase of 0.2 deaths per million was associated with a one unit increase in the 
Gini coefficient.  A decrease of 0.06 deaths per million was associated with an increase of one 
 Pett 31 
handwashing facility.  Relatedly, a decrease of 1.2 deaths per million was found to be associated 
with an increase of one hospital bed per thousand.  The effect size of GDP per capita was 
negligible even though it was significant, with an increase of 0.0004 deaths per million being 
associated with a one unit increase in GDP per capita.  An increase of 0.03 deaths per million 
was associated with an increase of one total test per thousand.  The squared date variable showed 
a negligible effect for deaths even though it was statistically significant.  An increase of 0.07 




Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept -9.5074 2.4266 -14.2636 -4.7513 -3.92 <0.0001 
Stringency Index -0.0261 0.0073 -0.0403 -0.0118 -3.58 0.0003 
Extreme Poverty -0.0356 0.0172 -0.0692 -0.0019 -2.07 0.0381 
Gini Coefficient 0.2252 0.0433 0.1404 0.3100 5.21 <0.0001 
Handwashing 
Facilities -0.0620 0.0182 -0.0975 -0.0264 -3.41 0.0006 
Hospital Beds 
Per Thousand -1.2488 0.3358 -1.9069 -0.5908 -3.72 0.0002 
GDP Per Capita 0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 4.02 <0.0001 
Total Tests Per 
Thousand 
0.0310 0.0068 0.0177 0.0443 4.58 <0.0001 
New Date 
Squared 
-0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -19.18 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0680 0.0019 0.0643 0.0716 36.12 <0.0001 
 
Table 6: GEE results for total deaths per million with stringency index, extreme poverty, Gini coefficient, 




These results indicate that economic factors and health infrastructure, as measured by the 
particular covariates in my model, do not have a large impact on leaders’ COVID-19 policy 
choices, as captured by the stringency index.  Only extreme poverty and date were statistically 
significant.  It was found that, as time increased from day zero, leaders’ policies became more 
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stringent on average.  Countries with less extreme poverty also had stricter policies.  This aligns 
with the findings from Bargain & Aminjonov (2020) that found that countries with higher rates 
of extreme poverty were associated with less stringent policies.  Rouzier et al (2020) claims that 
low-income countries are unable to completely shut down their economies due to these high 
extreme poverty rates, meaning that a large portion of the population could starve if stringent 
lockdowns were imposed.  Leaders from countries with extreme poverty have had to weigh 
losing lives due to COVID-19 with lives or health lost due to other causes that could stem from 
lockdowns. 
For the analyses of total cases and deaths per million, an increase in extreme poverty was 
found to only be associated with a decrease in deaths and did not associate with cases, 
independent of effects of the stringency index.  The association between extent of poverty and 
decreased deaths is surprising.  One possible explanation for this result is that countries with 
more extreme poverty tend to have populations with far more children than older people due to 
high fertility rates and adult mortality.  Thus, fewer deaths per case would be expected given this 
age structure, as a higher percent of the population over age 65 has been found in Chapter Two 
to be associated an increase in cases and deaths.  The absence of an association between extreme 
poverty and cases seems to conflict with the Bargain & Aminjonov (2020) study that found 
higher rates of extreme poverty was associated with an increase in cases.  This could be due to 
the differences in our studies, since theirs only contained Latin American countries and looked 
solely at regional differences instead of country-wide differences.  Furthermore, our studies 
differed in covariates included in models of cases and deaths, such as extent of testing.  Their 
study only included extreme poverty and a mobility index taken from cell phone data as 
covariates. 
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Increased testing was associated with more cases and deaths, with a much stronger effect 
for deaths.  Studies on testing have been restricted mostly to high-income nations such as the 
Begley (2020) study that found an increase in testing is not associated with an increase in cases 
among high-income nations.  When low and middle-income nations are included, this finding 
does not seem to hold.  This testing finding could also be one of the reasons why extreme 
poverty did not associate with case numbers.  It could be that, in countries with more extreme 
poverty, people were not tested for COVID-19 until they showed severe symptoms, thus keeping 
case estimates artificially low.   
Another income-related finding was that higher GDP per capita was associated with a 
slight increase in both cases and deaths.  This finding is at odds with the Bargain & Amimjonov 
(2020) that showed that a lower GDP per capita was associated with higher cases.  It could be 
that their analyses were run for the month of March, and a lot has changed regarding COVID-19 
since then.  The US has become the country with the most cases and deaths, thus potentially 
skewing my finding.  Other countries with relatively high GDP per capita have also had very 
high numbers of cases and deaths per million people, including the United Kingdom, France, 
Spain, and Italy.  Europe was hit quite hard by the pandemic at first, and this could help explain 
the finding that having a higher GPD per capita was associated with an increase in cases and 
deaths. 
An increase in Gini coefficient was associated with an increase in both cases and deaths, 
with a slightly stronger effect on deaths.  This finding is in accordance with the Chaudry et al 
(2020) that also found less income inequality to reduce both cases and deaths from COVID-19 
due to low levels of corruption in the flow of goods and services.  It is also possible that this 
relates to how people with relatively little wealth as compared to others are more likely to make 
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worse decisions, such as not following COVID-19 policies, thus potentially increasing cases and 
deaths for countries with more income inequality (Notovney, 2014).  
An increase in handwashing facilities was found to be associated with a decrease in both 
cases and deaths, with a stronger effect for deaths.  This finding is also in accordance with 
current studies and WHO recommendations (Brauer et al, 2020; Handwashing an Effective Tool 
to Prevent COVID-19, Other Diseases, 2020).  This provides further evidence for the 
effectiveness of handwashing in reducing the spread of COVID-19. 
Similarly, an increase in the number of hospital beds per thousand was associated with a 
decrease in both cases and deaths, with a stronger effect for deaths.  This finding aligns with the 
Barrera-Algarín et al (2020) findings even though this study only included European countries.  
When expanded to the rest of the world, this finding still holds.  This finding is likely due to 
having increased investment into healthcare institutions and thus a greater ability to treat a large 
influx of patients such as during a pandemic, decreasing both cases and deaths.   
Similar to the previous chapter, an increase in stringency index was associated with a 
decrease in both cases and deaths with similar effects on both.  This finding and the effect sizes 
were very similar to those of the previous chapter.  This shows that, even with economic and 
health infrastructure factors included in the model, stringency index is still a very important 
predictor of both cases and deaths.  Leaders’ policy choices have latitude independent of 
economic constraints. 
Lastly, as in the previous chapter, as time increased from day zero, both cases and deaths 
increased. 
Overall, these analyses seem to provide mixed support for the idea that leaders and their 
policies, independently, have had an effect on COVID-19 outcomes.  While economic and health 
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infrastructure factors do not seem to have much of an effect on leaders’ policies themselves, 
these factors do seem to have an effect on both cases and deaths.  However, stringency index is 
still statistically significant and demonstrates that leaders’ policies do have an effect on COVID-
19 cases and deaths, independent of broader economic factors and available health infrastructure.  
The next chapter will incorporate cultural factors into the analyses to ascertain whether leaders 
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Introduction: 
Cultural values and norms may influence leaders’ policy choices and COVID-19 
outcomes.  Prior research has found that more collectivist cultures, as opposed to more 
individualist cultures, are more prone to rapid transformation because people are more prone to 
social influence, and this could manifest in collectivist countries quickly transforming daily 
routines to fight COVID-19 to benefit the group (Muthukrishna and Schaller, 2020).  Countries 
that are more collectivist emphasize group wellbeing over individual freedoms, and this could 
explain less adherence to mask mandates in more individualistic countries that may have 
increased COVID-19 cases and deaths (Hogan, 2019).  Additionally, one large study with 175 
countries found that higher collectivism was associated with fewer cases and deaths from 
COVID-19 possibly due to collectivist populations having a better understanding that their 
behavior affects others’ health and wellbeing (Windsor et al., 2020).  Additionally, collectivist 
cultures have higher rates of xenophobia in response to threats, which could protect against 
diseases by encouraging less contact with others (Kim et al., 2016).   
Distinct from yet overlapping with the cultural dimension of individualism vs. 
collectivism is the cultural dimension of tightness vs. looseness.  Tighter cultures place a strong 
emphasis on social order and compliance with social norms, whereas more loose cultures are 
more likely to embrace a diversity of views and behaviors (Gelfand et al., 2011).  Prior 
experience of threats such as war, disease, or natural disaster is one factor explaining the 
emergence of tighter cultural norms (Gelfand et al., 2011).  Thus, looser cultures may become 
tighter with exposure to COVID-19, though not likely to the same degree as historically more 
collectivist cultures (Gelfand et al., 2011).   
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The degree of electoral democracy in a country may also affect a country’s policies.  
Countries with more authoritarian leadership and less democracy can enact stricter policies 
quicker due to less time spent debating and acquiring funding (Glezos, 2013).  This speed may 
prove useful for lessening the severity of COVID-19 outcomes, as policies can be quickly 
modified in response to the rapidly changing circumstances surrounding COVID-19 cases and 
deaths.  On the other hand, it may also be possible that more authoritarian countries may be more 
subject to the whims of the authoritarian head of state.  This could lead to policies that are more 
distant from scientific recommendations.  For example, Brazil’s more authoritarian president Jair 
Bolsonaro has repeatedly ignored recommendations from the scientific community in favor of 
downplaying the severity of COVID-19 and refusing to implement lockdowns (Muggah, 2021).  
Cases and deaths from COVID-19 in Brazil have remained very high throughout 2020 and 2021. 
It is possible that economic variables may matter more than cultural variables, or they 
may even moderate effects of the cultural values and norms.  For example, China is a more 
authoritarian country with many economic resources, and they were able to produce rapid change 
and build a high-quality hospital in ten days (Ankel, 2020).  More authoritarian countries with 
less economic resources were unable to achieve feats such as this.   
It is important to note that many other cultural values, such as gender egalitarianism, 
could have been selected for this study.  The gender of leaders in particular has garnered much 
attention during COVID-19, mainly due to the leaders of Norway, Iceland, and New Zealand 
receiving much media attention for being able to successfully halt the spread of COVID-19 
within their countries.  However, a recent study found that cultural values including collectivism 
have more of an association with COVID-19 outcomes than the gender of the leader (Windsor et 
al., 2020).  In this section, I will analyze countries’ cultural norms and democratic values to see 
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if these factors affected the stringency index or the number of cases and deaths per million in 
their countries.   
 
Predictions: 
I predict that the cultural variables will affect the stringency of leaders’ policies.  More 
specifically, I would expect increased tightness, decreased individualism, and increased 
authoritarianism to be associated with an increase in the stringency index.  I would also predict 
that these cultural values have effects on cases and deaths beyond their effect on the stringency 
of policies.  Based on the existing literature, I would expect increased tightness, decreased 
individualism, and increased authoritarianism to be associated with a decrease in cases and 
deaths.  Lastly, I predict that cultural variables have significant effects on stringency index and 
outcomes even independent of economic variables, and that some economic variables (GDP per 
capita and Gini coefficient) moderate effects of cultural variables. 
 
Methods: 
Chapter Four uses the following new independent variables: cultural tightness, 
individualism, and electoral democracy index.  The data for cultural tightness was collected in 
2019 and was obtained directly from Dr. Michele Gelfand, professor of psychology at the 
University of Maryland.  Tightness is measured on a six-item Likert scale that assesses the 
degree to which social norms are pervasive, clearly defined, and consistently imposed in each 
country.  Tightness was measured by participants rating the appropriateness of 12 behaviors 
((i.e., argue, eat, laugh, curse/swear, kiss, cry, sing, talk, flirt, listen to music, read newspaper, 
bargain) across 15 different situations (i.e., bank, doctor’s office, job interview, library, funeral, 
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classroom, restaurant, public park, bus, bedroom, city sidewalk, party, elevator, workplace, 
movies).  The mean values for appropriateness were calculated, with low values indicating that 
there are few appropriate behaviors in that situation and that the country is tighter.  Data for 
individualism was collected in 2015 and was obtained from Hofstede Insights (Home - Hofstede 
Insights Organisational Culture Consulting, 2021).  Individualism data was taken from 
employee value scores, which are a series of over 50 questions ascertaining people’s self-image, 
group values, and social preferences.  Data for the electoral democracy index was collected in 
2019 and was obtained from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Home | V-Dem, 2021).  
The electoral democracy index is calculated by taking the average of indices measuring freedom 
of expression, clean elections, elected officials, and suffrage.  V-Dem describes these variables 
in more detail:  
The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers 
responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s 
approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society 
organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or 
systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the 
country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media 
capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem 
conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any 
other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, 
egalitarian, or some other. (Home | V-Dem, 2021) 
Each of these indices are calculated by political experts from various universities from each 
country as well as taking input from citizen surveys on the four indices described above.  As in 
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previous chapters, this data for my cultural variables is not from the same year as my data 
relating to COVID-19, so this limitation may affect the results.  These cultural variables were 
selected based off of existing research on their effects on COVID-19 and other epidemics and 
pandemics in addition to their effects on public policy.   
As opposed to previous chapters where all the independent variables were included in the 
same analyses, these analyses were split due to worry about possible collinearity among the three 
cultural variables.  However, the variance inflation factor analyses showed no collinearity (see 
Appendix).  Regardless, I decided to run separate analyses anyways to retain larger sample sizes 
for most analyses.  Initial analyses were run with only the cultural variable, date, and stringency 
index included in the model.  If there was a significant association between the cultural variable 
and the outcome variables, then additional analyses including the economic variables from 
Chapter Three were run to assess if the cultural variables had an effect independent of the 
economic variables. 
Moderation was tested by interacting GDP per capita and Gini coefficient, since these 
variables had the strongest effects in the previous chapter, with the cultural variables that were 
found to be statistically significant. 
 
Results: 
 57 countries were included in the tightness GEE analyses since that was all there was 
data for.  Collinearity was only found between the two date variables, which is to be expected 
and can be found in the appendix.  For the analysis with stringency index as the outcome variable 
and tightness as the cultural variable of interest, none of the variables were significant at the 
p=0.05 level (Table 7).   
 Pett 42 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 4.2549 0.0377 4.1810 4.3288 112.82 <0.0001 
Tightness -0.0530 0.0541 -0.1590 0.0530 -0.98 0.3269 
New Date 
Squared -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -1.59 0.1128 
New Date -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0017 0.0012 -0.35 0.7284 
 
Table 7: GEE results for stringency index with tightness and date as independent variables. 
 
 For the analysis with total cases per million as the outcome variable and tightness as the 
cultural variable of interest, only stringency index and date were significant at the p=0.05 level 
(Table 8).  Tightness and total tests per thousand were not statistically significant.  A decrease of 
0.03 cases per million was associated with a one unit increase in the stringency index.  The 
squared date variable showed a negligible effect on cases even though it was statistically 
significant.  An increase of 0.05 cases per million was associated with an increase of one day 




Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 2.4042 0.5960 1.2361 3.5722 4.03 <0.0001 
Stringency 
Index 
-0.0298 0.0041 -0.0378 -0.0219 -7.36 <0.0001 
Tightness -0.1477 0.4891 -1.1563 0.7609 -0.40 0.6860 
Total Tests 
Per Thousand 
0.0014 0.0023 -0.0031 0.0059 0.62 0.5346 
New Date 
Squared -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -6.06 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0482 0.0055 0.0375 0.0590 8.78 <0.0001 
 
Table 8: GEE results for total cases per million with stringency index, tightness, total tests per thousand, and date as 
independent variables. 
 
 For the analysis with total deaths per million as the outcome variable and tightness as the 
cultural variable of interest, only the stringency index and date were significant at the p=0.05 
level (Table 9).  Tightness and total tests per thousand were not statistically significant.  A 
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decrease of 0.04 deaths per million was associated with a one unit increase in the stringency 
index.  The squared date variable showed a negligible effect on deaths even though it was 
statistically significant.  An increase of 0.05 deaths per million was associated with an increase 
of one day from day zero. 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 1.0869 0.3109 0.4777 1.6962 3.50 0.0005 
Stringency 
Index 
-0.0326 0.0012 -0.0350 -0.0303 -27.32 <0.0001 
Tightness -0.1342 0.2621 -1.6479 1.6206 -1.30 0.1936 
Total Tests 
Per Thousand 0.0010 0.0021 -0.0011 0.0018 1.90 0.0574 
New Date 
Squared -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -62.26 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0680 0.0009 0.0661 0.0698 73.24 <0.0001 
 
Table 9: GEE results for total deaths per million with stringency index, tightness, total tests per thousand, and date 
as independent variables. 
 
The same 180 countries as the previous chapters were included in the individualism GEE 
analyses.  For the analysis with stringency index as the outcome variable and individualism as 
the cultural variable of interest, all variables were significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 10).  A 
0.003 unit decrease in the stringency index was associated with a one unit increase in 
individualism.  The squared date variable showed a negligible effect on the stringency index 
even though it was statistically significant.  A 0.0006 unit increase in the stringency index was 
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Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 4.4494 0.0454 4.3605 4.5384 98.04 <0.0001 
Individualism -0.0028 0.0011 -0.0049 -0.0007 -2.62 0.0088 
New Date 
Squared -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -2.63 0.0011 
New Date 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0009 2.71 0.0068 
 
Table 10: GEE results for stringency index with individualism and date as independent variables. 
 
 For the analysis with total cases per million as the outcome variable and individualism as 
the cultural variable of interest, all variables were significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 11).  A 
decrease of 0.03 cases per million was associated with a one unit increase in the stringency 
index.  An increase of 0.01 cases per million was associated with a one unit increase in 
individualism.  An increase of 0.003 cases per million was associated with an increase of one test 
per thousand.  The squared date variable showed a negligible effect on cases even though it was 
statistically significant.  An increase of 0.06 cases per million was associated with an increase of 
one day from day zero. 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 2.8171 1.1061 0.3507 3.9849 2.80 0.0051 
Stringency Index -0.0291 0.0080 -0.0448 -0.0133 -3.62 0.0003 
Individualism 0.0145 0.0082 0.0009 0.0291 2.13 0.0332 
Total Tests Per 
Thousand 0.0032 0.0013 0.0011 0.0054 2.03 0.0424 
New Date 
Squared -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -10.76 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0504 0.0063 0.0381 0.0628 7.99 <0.0001 
 
Table 11: GEE results for total cases per million with stringency index, individualism, total tests per thousand, and 
date as independent variables. 
 
For the analysis with total deaths per million as the outcome variable and individualism 
as the cultural variable of interest, all variables were significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 12).  A 
decrease of 0.03 deaths per million was associated with a one unit increase in the stringency 
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index.  An increase of 0.05 deaths per million was associated with a one unit increase in 
individualism.  An increase of 0.002 deaths per million was associated with an increase of one 
test per thousand.  The squared date variable showed a negligible effect on deaths even though it 
was statistically significant.  An increase of 0.07 deaths per million was associated with an 




Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 2.3985 0.4977 1.4231 3.3740 4.82 <0.0001 
Stringency Index -0.0327 0.0008 -0.0342 -0.0311 -41.10 <0.0001 
Individualism 0.0337 0.0097 0.0146 0.0528 3.46 0.0005 
Total Tests Per 
Thousand 
0.0015 0.0008 0.0009 0.0022 2.14 0.0324 
New Date 
Squared 
-0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -81.44 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0714 0.0006 0.0702 0.0726 117.03 <0.0001 
 
Table 12: GEE results for total deaths per million with stringency index, individualism, total tests per thousand, and 
date as independent variables. 
 
For the analysis with stringency index as the outcome variable and individualism as the 
cultural variable of interest with economic variables added, the variables of extreme poverty, 
GDP per capita, and date were significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 13).  A 0.01 unit decrease in 
the stringency index was associated with a 1% increase in the population living in extreme 
poverty.  The effect size of GDP per capita was negligible even though it was statistically 
significant, with a slight decrease in the stringency index being associated with a one unit 
increase in GDP per capita.  The squared date variable showed a negligible effect on the 
stringency index even though it was statistically significant.  A 0.0048 unit increase in the 
stringency index was associated with an increase of 1 day from day zero. 
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Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 4.6033 0.1396 4.3297 4.8768 32.99 <0.0001 
Individualism 0.0023 0.0041 -0.0057 0.0103 0.57 0.5683 
Extreme Poverty -0.0101 0.0025 -0.0150 -0.0051 -4.00 <0.0001 
Gini Coefficient -0.0032 0.0048 -0.0131 0.0061 -0.48 0.5781 
Handwashing 
Facilities 0.0007 0.0020 -0.0032 0.0046 0.36 0.7171 
Hospital Beds 
Per Thousand 0.0637 0.0432 -0.0209 0.1483 1.48 0.1401 
GDP Per Capita -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -2.05 0.0407 
Total Tests Per 
Thousand 
0.0009 0.0008 -0.0007 0.0026 1.13 0.2578 
New Date 
Squared 
-0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -2.16 0.0306 
New Date 0.0048 0.0010 0.0029 0.0063 1.82 0.0392 
 
Table 13: GEE results for stringency index with individualism, extreme poverty, Gini coefficient, handwashing 
facilities, hospital beds per thousand, GDP per capita, total tests per thousand, and date as independent variables. 
 
For the analysis with total cases per million as the outcome variable and individualism as 
the cultural variable of interest with economic variables added, the variables of stringency index, 
Gini coefficient, GDP per capita, total tests per thousand, and date were all significant at the 
p=0.05 level (Table 14).  Individualism, extreme poverty, handwashing facilities, and hospital 
beds per thousand were not statistically significant.  A decrease of 0.03 cases per million was 
associated with a one unit increase in the stringency index.  Additionally, an increase of 0.2 cases 
per million was associated with a one unit increase in the Gini coefficient.  An increase of 0.0001 
cases per million was associated with a one unit increase in GDP per capita.  An increase of 
0.009 cases per million was associated with an increase of one total test per thousand.  The 
squared date variable showed a negligible effect for cases even though it was statistically 
significant. An increase of 0.06 cases per million was associated with an increase of one day 
from day zero. 
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Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 1.2975 0.7441 -0.1609 2.7560 1.74 0.0812 
Stringency Index -0.0254 0.0048 -0.0348 -0.0159 -5.26 <0.0001 
Individualism -0.0193 0.0258 -0.0699 0.0314 -0.75 0.4559 
Extreme Poverty -0.0183 0.0214 -0.0603 0.0237 -0.85 0.3935 
Gini Coefficient 0.2022 0.0381 0.1299 0.2767 3.36 <0.0001 
Handwashing 
Facilities -0.0216 0.0111 -0.0434 0.0001 -1.95 0.0512 
Hospital Beds 
Per Thousand -0.2375 0.1573 -0.5458 0.0707 -1.51 0.1310 
GDP Per Capita 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 2.81 0.0049 
Total Tests Per 
Thousand 
0.0094 0.0031 0.0032 0.0155 3.00 0.0027 
New Date 
Squared -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -9.51 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0622 0.0030 0.0564 0.0680 21.02 <0.0001 
 
Table 14: GEE results for total cases per million with stringency index, individualism, extreme poverty, Gini 
coefficient, handwashing facilities, hospital beds per thousand, GDP per capita, total tests per thousand, and date as 
independent variables. 
 
For the analysis with total deaths per million as the outcome variable and individualism 
as the cultural variable of interest with economic variables added, the variables of stringency 
index, Gini coefficient, GDP per capita, total tests per thousand, and date were all significant at 
the p=0.05 level (Table 15).  Individualism, extreme poverty, handwashing facilities, and 
hospital beds per thousand were not statistically significant.  A decrease of 0.03 deaths per 
million was associated with a one unit increase in the stringency index.  Additionally, an increase 
of 0.2 deaths per million was associated with a one unit increase in the Gini coefficient.  An 
increase of 0.0001 deaths per million was associated with a one unit increase in GDP per capita.  
An increase of 0.01 deaths per million was associated with an increase of one total test per 
thousand.  The squared date variable showed a negligible effect for deaths even though it was 
statistically significant. An increase of 0.06 deaths per million was associated with an increase of 
one day from day zero. 
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Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 1.3104 0.7351 -0.1596 2.7601 1.72 0.0787 
Stringency Index -0.0261 0.0046 -0.0342 -0.0163 -5.81 <0.0001 
Individualism -0.0199 0.0263 -0.0714 0.0322 -0.68 0.4562 
Extreme Poverty -0.0189 0.0212 -0.0597 0.02362 -0.86 0.3941 
Gini Coefficient 0.2028 0.0379 0.1303 0.2762 3.42 <0.0001 
Handwashing 
Facilities -0.0223 0.0119 -0.0438 0.0002 -1.91 0.0525 
Hospital Beds 
Per Thousand -0.2378 0.1575 -0.5465 0.0709 -1.46 0.1332 
GDP Per Capita 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 2.83 0.0046 
Total Tests Per 
Thousand 
0.0098 0.0029 0.0037 0.0151 3.09 0.0024 
New Date 
Squared -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -9.97 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0636 0.0032 0.0584 0.0672 21.79 <0.0001 
 
Table 15: GEE results for total deaths per million with stringency index, individualism, extreme poverty, Gini 
coefficient, handwashing facilities, hospital beds per thousand, GDP per capita, total tests per thousand, and date as 
independent variables.  
 
The same 180 countries as the previous chapters were included in the individualism GEE 
analyses.  For the analysis with stringency index as the outcome variable and electoral 
democracy index as the cultural variable of interest, none of the variables were significant at the 
p=0.05 level (Table 16).   
 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 4.3461 0.0582 4.2320 4.4602 74.65 <0.0001 
Electoral 
Democracy Index 0.0212 0.1041 -0.1828 0.2252 0.20 0.8386 
New Date 
Squared 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.13 0.8958 
New Date -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0012 0.0009 -0.33 0.5896 
 
Table 16: GEE results for stringency index with electoral democracy index and date as independent variables. 
 
For the analysis with total cases per million as the outcome variable and electoral 
democracy index as the cultural variable of interest, stringency index, total tests per thousand, 
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and date were significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 17).  Electoral democracy index was not 
statistically significant.  A decrease of 0.03 cases per million was associated with a one unit 
increase in the stringency index.  An increase of 0.01 cases per million was associated with an 
increase of one total test per thousand.  The squared date variable showed a negligible effect on 
cases even though it was statistically significant.  An increase of 0.05 cases per million was 
associated with an increase of one day from day zero. 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 2.0183 0.6836 0.6785 3.3581 2.95 0.0032 
Stringency 




0.3846 0.6464 -0.8823 1.6515 0.60 0.5518 
Total Tests 
Per Thousand 
0.0113 0.0041 0.0048 0.0181 2.88 0.0040 
New Date 
Squared 
-0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 -5.86 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0426 0.0034 0.0360 0.0492 12.65 <0.0001 
 
Table 17: GEE results for total cases per million with stringency index, electoral democracy index, total tests per 
thousand, and date as independent variables. 
 
For the analysis with total deaths per million as the outcome variable and electoral 
democracy index as the cultural variable of interest, stringency index, total tests per thousand, 
and date were significant at the p=0.05 level (Table 17).  Electoral democracy index was not 
statistically significant.  A decrease of 0.03 deaths per million was associated with a one unit 
increase in the stringency index.  An increase of 0.0007 deaths per million was associated with 
an increase of one total test per thousand.  The squared date variable showed a negligible effect 
on deaths even though it was statistically significant.  An increase of 0.06 deaths per million was 
associated with an increase of one day from day zero. 




Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 2.2874 0.4701 1.3659 3.2088 4.87 <0.0001 
Stringency 




0.8904 0.6993 -0.6172 1.9754 1.46 0.1443 
Total Tests 
Per Thousand 
0.0007 0.0003 0.0002 0.0013 2.22 0.0264 
New Date 
Squared -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -82.04 <0.0001 
New Date 0.0675 0.0005 0.0665 0.0685 131.07 <0.0001 
 
Table 18: GEE results for total deaths per million with stringency index, electoral democracy index, total tests per 
thousand, and date as independent variables. 
 
 The appendix lists the results for the moderation analyses.  None of the interaction terms 
were found to be statistically significant at the p=0.05 level. 
 
Discussion: 
 These results indicate that neither cultural tightness nor the electoral democracy index has 
an impact on either leaders’ COVID-19 policy choices or COVID-19 outcomes. This is 
surprising, given that tighter countries have stricter social norms, which could be used to create 
stricter COVID-19 policies that halt the spread of the pandemic (Gelfand et al., 2011).  It is 
possible that this finding is due to the differences in my sample for tightness as opposed to my 
sample for individualism. Notably, few countries in the Middle East were included in the 
tightness sample.  This difference in samples may have accounted for tightness not having an 
effect on stringency index or cases and deaths.  The insignificance of the electoral democracy 
index was also an interesting finding, given that more authoritarian countries are typically able to 
enact stricter policies that could have been used to halt COVID-19 and limit cases and deaths 
(Glezos, 2013).  It is possible that there was simply a wide range of policy choices from both 
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democratic countries and authoritarian countries.  For example, Sweden was a democratic 
country that ranks high in democracy yet did not implement strict policies, and as a result had 
high cases and deaths from COVID-19 as compared to New Zealand, a democratic country that 
took a different approach and implemented strict policies with great success in terms of low 
cases and deaths (Baker et al., 2020; Pierre, 2020).  In terms of countries with lower democracy, 
Vietnam enacted very strict policies that were effective at limiting cases and deaths from 
COVID-19, whereas Iran’s leader did not implement strict policies and faced very high cases and 
deaths (Keshavarz, 2020; Trevisan et al., 2020).  These are only four specific examples, but they 
demonstrate that there was high variation in the policy choices and pandemic outcomes from 
countries with varying degrees of democracy.   
 The initial analyses indicate that individualism has an impact on both leaders’ COVID-19 
policy choices and, independent of policy, on cases and deaths from COVID-19.  Lower 
individualism was associated with high stringency and fewer cases and deaths, displaying the 
strongest effect on deaths and the weakest effect on stringency.  This finding is in accordance 
with the Windsor et al (2020) study that used the same dataset and found that countries with 
lower individualism scores had lower cases and deaths from COVID-19.  One possible 
explanation for this is that countries with lower individualism are more focused on the wellbeing 
and collective health and security of the group as opposed to maximizing individual liberty, thus 
possibly allowing leaders to enact stricter policies since they may have more public support for 
strict policies that serve to benefit the group (Hogan, 2019).  More people in less individualist 
cultures may abide by these stringent policies since they care less about individual freedom and 
more about protecting their group, thus potentially limiting cases and deaths from COVID-19. 
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 However, once economic variables were included in the analysis, individualism did not 
seem to be associated with either leaders’ COVID-19 policy choices or COVID-19 outcomes.  
An increase in extreme poverty was associated with a decrease in the stringency index and, 
unlike the model from the previous chapter, had no effect on cases and deaths.  An increase in 
GDP per capita was associated with a decrease in the stringency index and an increase in cases 
and deaths, with the strongest effect on deaths and the weakest effect on the stringency index.  It 
is also worth noting that GDP per capita was not significantly associated with the stringency 
index in the previous chapter.  The addition of individualism into the model seems to have 
increased the effect of GDP on the stringency index, and the reason for this is unclear, but the 
effect size is still extremely small. An increase in the Gini coefficient was not associated with the 
stringency index, but it was associated with an increase in both cases and deaths, with a slightly 
stronger effect on deaths.  In models of cases and deaths, an increase in the stringency index was 
associated with a decrease in cases and in deaths, with a slightly stronger effect on deaths.  This 
shows that, even with economic factors and a cultural variable included in the model, stringency 
index is still a very important predictor of both cases and deaths.  Leaders’ COVID-19 policy 
choices appear to have an effect independent of economic constraints and cultural constraints. 
Since it is possible that economic factors facilitate the effect of cultural values on policy 
choice and implementation, additional models of the stringency index, cases, and deaths were 
run.  I tested the interaction of individualism with the Gini coefficient, and the interaction of 
individualism with GDP per capita.  China, for example, has the money to make its collectivist, 
tight, authoritarian impulses in the context of COVID-19 a reality (Ankel, 2020).  However, none 
of the interaction terms were significant in the models (see Appendix). 
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 In this chapter, I showed that individualism-collectivism (but not tightness-looseness nor 
democracy index) has an effect on the stringency of leaders’ policies and on cases and deaths 
independent of policy.  However, the effects of individualism did not persist when competing 
with the economic variables.  Furthermore, individualism was not moderated by the economic 
variables.  It may be possible that individualism has an indirect effect on outcomes through 
impacting the economic variables, but this was not tested.  It should be noted that only three 
cultural variables were included in these analyses, and it is possible that there are others that 
could prove to be significant.  Additionally, since these cultural measures were composite scores 
of multiple cultural factors, it is also possible that the individual measures could prove to be 
significant, but the composite scores are not.  It seems that economic factors have a larger effect 
on leaders’ policies and outcomes from COVID-19.   Throughout all of the analyses, the 
stringency index was found to be statistically significant for cases and deaths, indicating that 
leaders’ policies influence cases and deaths independent of economic factors or cultural norms 
and values.  The next chapter will focus on countries that have experienced leadership changes 
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Introduction: 
 This chapter analyzes COVID-19 policy changes over time for five countries that 
experienced a change in their head of state in 2020: Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Japan, 
Belgium, and Jordan.  Analyzing changes in leadership can help us to understand whether 
individual leaders matter in terms of their ability to affect COVID-19 policies.  This is because it 
is unlikely that such leadership change closely covaries with significant change in the 
demographic, economic, and cultural measures that may independently affect COVID-19 cases 
and deaths.  However, a better means of estimating leader effects would be through random 
assignment, which is not possible in this context. 
 Guyana’s leadership change occurred on August 2nd when the new president Irfaan Ali 
was officially sworn in (Ellis, 2020).  He was elected in 2019, so he did not run his campaign 
based on COVID-19 policies.  There was a long gap between his election and his swearing in 
due to the former president, David Granger, claiming the election was fraudulent and bringing 
many lawsuits to court (Prince, 2020).  The courts found no evidence of fraud and declared Ali 
the president-elect of Guyana.  Thus, prior to Ali taking office, Guyana was less focused on 
COVID-19 response and more focused on the future of the country (Sanders, 2020).  Given, this, 
cases did remain relatively low for a while, even as neighboring countries saw increases in their 
cases (Ellis, 2020).  After Ali was sworn in, he promised to increase testing capacity and ensure 
that frontline workers and hospitals had adequate supplies, equipment, and drugs to treat 
COVID-19 patients (“President Defends Handling of COVID-19,” 2020).  In the months before 
he was sworn in, cases began to increase, and the former president implemented many strict 
measures including closing all schools, recommending that people work from home, cancelling 
all public events, restricting gatherings of more than ten people, requiring people to remain at 
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home except for essential trips, requiring face masks in all public places, coordinating 
information campaigns on COVID-19, restricting public transportation, restricting internal 
movement, and closing borders (“President Defends Handling of COVID-19,” 2020).  Many of 
these measures were less strict by the time Ali took office, and he focused more on rebuilding the 
economy since his campaign was run on economic reforms.  Acknowledging that these measures 
would negatively impact the economy, he created a $24 million COVID-19 relief grant to 
provide loans to business and $120 to each household (“President Defends Handling of COVID-
19,” 2020).  Ali hoped that these funds would allow people to comply with the stringent COVID-
19 policies by encouraging people to stay at home and socially distance. 
 The Dominican Republic’s leadership change occurred on August 16th after the formal 
swearing in of new president Luis Abinader (Can the Dominican Republic’s New President 
Deliver on High Hopes for Change?, 2020).  The presidential election was originally scheduled 
for May but had to be postponed two months due to worsening COVID-19 outbreaks across the 
country (Peschard-Sverdrup, 2020).  Abinader ran his campaign largely focused on fighting 
COVID-19.  He promised to create policies to help support the badly hurt tourism sector which 
represents 10% of the country’s economy (A Conversation with President Luis Abinader of the 
Dominican Republic | Wilson Center, 2020).  During his campaign he provided aid and 
protective equipment to citizens instead of holding campaign rallies (Can the Dominican 
Republic’s New President Deliver on High Hopes for Change?, 2020).  The Dominican Republic 
has been the hardest-hit country in the Caribbean with COVID-19, far surpassing nearby 
countries in terms of both cases and deaths.  At the beginning of the pandemic, the former 
president implemented very strict policies to curb COVID-19.  These policies included: closing 
all schools, requiring that non-essential workers work from home, cancelling all public events, 
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restricting gatherings of more than ten people, requiring people to remain at home except for 
essential trips, requiring face masks in all public places, coordinating information campaigns on 
COVID-19, closing public transportation, restricting internal movement, and closing borders 
(Can the Dominican Republic’s New President Deliver on High Hopes for Change?, 2020).  The 
former president was not up for reelection, so his efforts were largely focused on COVID-19 
response efforts as opposed to garnering public support.  However, there was significant 
discontent in the country with how the pandemic was handled and the strict policies that did not 
seem to be working to limit cases and deaths (“Change in Dominican Republic as Opposition 
Wins Presidency,” 2020).  Since then, policies have gradually decreased in stringency over time 
as cases and deaths have also decreased.  Since taking office, Abinader has increased testing 
capacity and the amount of Red Cross doctors in the country (David, 2020).  He remains focused 
on reviving the tourism industry through economic loans (A Conversation with President Luis 
Abinader of the Dominican Republic | Wilson Center, 2020).  
 Japan’s leadership change occurred on September 16th after former prime minister Shinzo 
Abe resigned and Yoshihide Suga was appointed as the new prime minister (Takenaka, 2020).  
Even though Abe cited health issues as his reason for leaving, many people think that he also left 
because of his drastically plummeting approval rating due to his handling of the pandemic 
(Pesek, 2020).  Abe chose to experiment with implementing rather lax COVID-19 restrictions, 
which were mainly recommendations, instead of full lockdowns as seen in much of the rest of 
the world due to Japan’s constitution preventing full lockdowns (Mark, 2020).  While this 
worked for a time, cases eventually began to increase, and Abe still did not enforce lockdowns.  
Instead, he continued preparing for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and implemented the “Go To 
Travel” campaign which encouraged travel from areas where the virus was rampant to places 
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less severely hit by providing people with travel stipends (Sugiyama, 2020).  Once Suga assumed 
office, he at first was reluctant to implement any new restrictions and still encouraged the Go To 
Travel program even though cases and deaths were surging (Sugiyama, 2021a).  However, after 
polls showed that more than 60% of the population wanted lockdowns, he gradually increased 
restrictions (Pesek, 2020).  These stricter restrictions included recommending schools and 
workplaces close, recommending cancelling public events, restricting gatherings of more than 
1,000 people, recommending that face masks be worn, coordinating information campaigns, 
reducing public transport, recommending that internal movement be limited, and closing borders 
(Sugiyama, 2021b).  He also passed an act that provided income relief to low-income families 
(Mark, 2020).  Suga has also voiced his support for Japan going carbon neutral and digitalizing, 
but many citizens fear that pursuing these issues will distract from the government’s pandemic 
response (Sugiyama, 2021b). 
 Belgium’s leadership change occurred on October 1st after Alexander De Croo was 
officially appointed as prime minister (Gijs & Moens, 2020).  His predecessor mainly left the 
different regions in Belgium to decide for themselves which restrictions to implement, if any 
(Moens & Gijs, 2020).  The Flemish-speaking north regions implemented strict measures to 
contain COVID-19 including closing all schools, recommending that people work from home, 
cancelling all public events, restricting gatherings of more than ten people, requiring people to 
remain at home except for essential trips, requiring face masks in all public places, coordinating 
information campaigns on COVID-19, restricting public transportation, restricting internal 
movement, and closing borders (Wilmès, 2020).  These restrictions were laxed after a few 
months.  The French-speaking south regions chose to prioritize the economy and implemented 
very few restrictions (Moens & Gijs, 2020).  This patchwork system led to Belgium having the 
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highest infection rates in Europe in the month prior to De Croo taking office, completely 
overwhelming hospitals (Keating, 2020).  After De Croo became prime minister, he abandoned 
this regional approach and initially implemented relatively lax national restrictions.  Shortly 
afterwards, cases in the French-speaking southern regions continued to increase, leading 
politicians and citizens to call for stricter measures (Moens & Gijs, 2020).  De Croo then 
nationally implemented many of the same stringent policies that the northern regions 
implemented at the pandemic’s onset.  De Croo has promised citizens that he will focus on 
unifying the divided country, and his first priority is halting the spread of COVID-19 (Keating, 
2020).  This centralized approach has worked thus far, as cases have greatly decreased, and 
Belgium currently has one of the lowest infection rates in Europe. 
 Jordan’s leadership change occurred on October 12th after the King dissolved parliament, 
which occurs every few years in Jordan (AP, 2020).  The country’s constitution states that the 
government must be dissolved within ten days of parliament, so the president was required to 
resign.  The King quickly appointed a new president, Bisher Al-Khasawneh.  At the pandemic’s 
onset in March of 2020, the former president implemented some of the strictest policies in the 
world (Arraf, 2020).  These included closing all schools, closing workplaces, cancelling all 
public events, restricting all gatherings, requiring people to remain at home at all times, requiring 
face masks in all places, coordinating information campaigns on COVID-19, closing public 
transportation, restricting internal movement, and closing borders (Arraf, 2020).  These 
restrictions were lifted after a few months, giving way to more lax policies so that the economy 
could reopen.  However, shortly after borders were reopened to neighboring countries, infected 
border officials brought COVID-19 back into the country after not having any local transmission 
for months, and outbreaks occurred shortly before the King appointed a new president (Luck, 
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2020).  Citizens became angry that the very strict lockdowns did not work like their government 
promised.  Due to the lockdowns, unemployment rates in Jordan soared to record highs of 23% 
overall and 60% for adults under age 30 (Luck, 2020).  The new president, Al-Khasawneh, could 
not afford to implement the same strict policies as his predecessor and risk these rates increasing.  
He has vowed to balance the health of citizens with the health of the economy, acknowledging 
that a broken economy will also cause unnecessary deaths (Al-Khalidi, 2020).  Thus far in his 
term, he has expanded the National Aid Fund by increasing its budget to $141 million to provide 
relief to over 400,000 families (Jordan Launches New Measures to Combat COVID-19 Setbacks, 
2020).  Recently, he has been focused on reviving the tourism sector by providing interest-free 
loans and by adding 180,000 jobs to other sectors.  He has also promised to invest in the 
country’s healthcare system and boost capacity to ensure that it will not collapse if community 
spread increases (Al-Khalidi, 2020).   
 
Prediction: 
 I predict that, after a leadership change occurs, the stringency index will increase and 
have a steeper slope than before the leadership change since new leaders will want to quickly 
gain public approval for their handling of the pandemic.  However, this effect is likely contingent 
on the level of cases and deaths before the leadership change.  I predict that the higher the cases 
and deaths were before the leadership change, the more likely it is to see higher stringency after 
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Methods: 
 This chapter examines five countries that experienced leadership changes in 2020: 
Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Japan, Belgium, and Jordan.  While there were other countries 
that experienced leadership changes in their heads of state, I restricted the countries that I 
included in my analysis to countries where I had at least two full months of data before and after 
the leadership change.  I then plotted scatterplots of the stringency index for each country over 
time, beginning with the first day that each country reached 50 total cases and ending on 
December 31st, 2020.  I added linear regression lines to each plot and then compared the slopes 
before and after the leadership change.   
 
Results: 
 In Guyana, there did not appear to be a large difference in the stringency index before 
and after their leadership change based on the slopes of the regression lines (Figure 1).  The 
slope of the regression line before the leadership change was -0.1276 with an R2 value of 0.8472.  




Figure 1: Line chart of the stringency index in Guyana over time.  The left regression line models the stringency 
index from April 16th to August 1st, before the leadership change.  The right regression line models the stringency 
index from August 2nd to December 31st, after the leadership change.  The vertical red line between the panels 
represents the leadership change. 
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In the Dominican Republic, there also did not appear to be a major difference in the 
stringency index before and after their leadership change (Figure 2).  The slope of the regression 
line before the leadership change was -0.1380 with an R2 value of 0.5821.  The slope after the 




Figure 2: Line chart of the stringency index in the Dominican Republic over time.  The left regression line models 
the stringency index from March 22nd to August 15th, before the leadership change.  The right regression line models 
the stringency index from August 16th to December 31st, after the leadership change.  The vertical red line between 
the panels represents the leadership change. 
 
In Japan, however, there did appear to be a difference in the stringency index before and 
after their leadership change (Figure 3).  The slope of the regression line before the leadership 
change was -0.0638 with an R2 value of 0.2170.  The slope after the leadership change was 
0.1815 with an R2 value of 0.7490.   
 
 
 Pett 63 
 
Figure 3: Line chart of the stringency index in Japan over time.  The left regression line models the stringency index 
from February 16th to September 15th, before the leadership change.  The right regression line models the stringency 
index from September 16th to December 31st, after the leadership change.  The vertical red line between the panels 
represents the leadership change. 
 
 
In Belgium, there also appeared to be a slight difference in the stringency index before 
and after their leadership change (Figure 4).  The slope of the regression line before the 
leadership change was -0.0916 with an R2 value of 0.1230.  The slope after the leadership change 
was 0.1639 with an R2 value of 0.4198.   
 
 
Figure 4: Line chart of the stringency index in Belgium over time.  The left regression line models the stringency 
index from March 5th to September 30th, before the leadership change.  The right regression line models the 
stringency index from October 1st to December 31st, after the leadership change.  The vertical red line between the 
panels represents the leadership change. 
 
In Jordan, there also appeared to be a small difference in the stringency index before and 
after their leadership change (Figure 5).  The slope of the regression line before the leadership 
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change was -0.2154 with an R2 value of 0.4459.  The slope after the leadership change was 




Figure 5: Line chart of the stringency index in Jordan over time.  The left regression line models the stringency 
index from March 18th to October 11th, before the leadership change.  The right regression line models the 
stringency index from October 12th to December 31st, after the leadership change.  The vertical red line between the 
panels represents the leadership change. 
 
Discussion: 
 Of the five countries included in this chapter, only Guyana and the Dominican Republic 
did not appear to have any significant difference in the stringency index after their leadership 
change.  Japan, Belgium, and Jordan all appeared to experience differences in the stringency 
index after their leadership changes occurred.  These changes did appear to depend to some 
extent on the severity of cases and deaths immediately prior to the leadership change, with 
Guyana and the Dominican Republic having relatively low and declining levels of cases and 
deaths prior to their leadership changes (“President Defends Handling of COVID-19,” 2020; 
“Change in Dominican Republic as Opposition Wins Presidency,” 2020).  Japan, Belgium, and 
Jordan all had quite high and rising levels of cases and deaths prior to their leadership changes 
(Sugiyama, 2021a; Keating, 2020; Luck, 2020).  
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 It is relatively unsurprising that Guyana did not experience a major change in the 
stringency index after Irfaan Ali took office.  His campaign was focused on economic reforms, 
so his COVID-19 policies were largely geared toward rebuilding the economy rather than 
implementing new restrictions (“President Defends Handling of COVID-19,” 2020).  Guyana’s 
former president implemented very strict policies at the beginning of COVID-19, but over time 
decreased the stringency of these restrictions.  Ali appears to have generally continued this trend.   
 It is also relatively unsurprising that the Dominican Republic did not experience large 
changes to their stringency index.  This is mainly due to the former president implementing some 
of the strictest possible policies and then gradually relaxing those policies due to public 
discontent (“Change in Dominican Republic as Opposition Wins Presidency,” 2020).  The new 
president has been focused on providing relief to the tourism industry and laxing restrictions to 
hopefully encourage more tourists to come to the Dominican Republic and rebuild the economy 
(A Conversation with President Luis Abinader of the Dominican Republic | Wilson Center, 
2020).   
 After the shift in leadership in Japan, there appeared to be an increase in the stringency 
index.  The former prime minister notably avoided lockdowns in favor of the economy 
(Sugiyama, 2020).  The new prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, chose to prioritize the economy at 
first as well.  However, after public outrage with the lack of government response, he then 
implemented stricter measures to limit the outbreaks (Sugiyama, 2021b).  It is worth noting that 
the regression line for the model before the leadership change is a poor fit, as indicated by the R2 
value being close to zero since the stringency index vacillated over time.  This indicates that 
there was no discernable trend in policy over time for the previous prime minister. 
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Belgium also experienced a slight increase in the stringency index after their leadership 
change.  The former prime minister did not implement many national restrictions, leaving 
regions to largely decide for themselves which measures to implement (Moens & Gijs, 2020).  
At the pandemic’s onset, many of these measures were strict but then gradually laxed to avoid a 
long economic shutdown.  After De Croo took office, the stringency of his national policies 
gradually increased over time in an attempt to control the country’s many outbreaks and keep his 
promise to promote the health of all citizens (Keating, 2020).  However, it should be noted that 
the regression line for the model before the leadership change is a very poor fit, as indicated by 
the R2 value being close to zero due to the vacillating stringency index.  Thus, caution is needed 
when interpreting these results since there was no apparent trend in policy for the previous prime 
minister. 
Jordan experienced a small difference in the stringency index after their leadership 
change.  Under the former president, Jordan experienced a great deal of variation in the 
stringency of COVID-19 policies, with extremely strict policies early on and laxer policies in the 
summer.  The new president, Al-Khasawneh, has kept the stringency of COVID-19 restrictions 
at relatively the same level during his term thus far.  These policies are still rather strict, as Al-
Khasawneh notes that the country is ill-equipped to handle a large influx of patients, so 
prevention of this situation is crucial (Al-Khalidi, 2020).  His policies are notably not as strict as 
his predecessor’s.  This aligns with the promises he made to his citizens at the beginning of his 
term to focus more on rebuilding the economy and creating jobs, especially in the tourism sector 
(Jordan Launches New Measures to Combat COVID-19 Setbacks, 2020). 
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Conclusions: 
 This thesis set out to examine if leaders’ policies mattered during the time of COVID-19.  
Chapter Two analyzed the effect of the stringency index on COVID-19 cases and deaths, finding 
that leaders’ policies did have an impact on COVID-19 outcomes.  Chapter Three factored in 
economic and health infrastructure variables to assess whether leaders mattered independent of 
the economic factors in their countries.  Stringency index was largely unaffected by economic 
factors other than extreme poverty, and stringency index was still found to affect COVID-19 
outcomes even after accounting for economic variables.  Other economic variables affected these 
outcomes as well, including extreme poverty, the Gini coefficient, handwashing facilities, 
hospital beds per thousand, GDP per capita, and the total COVID-19 tests per thousand.  Chapter 
Four examined if leaders’ policy mattered independent of their countries’ cultural values and 
norms.  Only cultural individualism was found to affect the stringency of leaders’ policies, but 
this effect disappeared once economic variables were factored into the analyses.  The stringency 
index was still found to impact COVID-19 outcomes independent of cultural values and norms.  
Chapter Five examined five countries that experienced leadership changes during the pandemic 
to isolate the effects of leadership on COVID-19 policies.  It was found that three of the five 
countries analyzed appeared to have differences in the stringency indices before and after their 
leadership changes occurred. 
 There are many future areas of research that are needed to better ascertain the impacts of 
leadership during this pandemic.  My study used data up until October 2020 for earlier chapters, 
but cases did spike in much of the world over the winter months and into early 2021 (Wang et 
al., 2021).  These spikes could affect the results that I found in many of my chapters.  
Additionally, I began my analyses before effective vaccines were approved in most of the world.  
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Leaders likely had an effect on the vaccine rollout in their respective countries.  This area would 
be interesting to explore the influence of leaders and their policy choices on vaccine rollout 
efficiency and strategy.  Strategies have been varied, with the UK choosing to prioritize first 
doses and the US prioritizing second doses.  These priorities likely have consequences for 
COVID-19 cases and deaths, but the consequences are not yet known.  Additionally, I limited 
my analyses in Chapter Five to countries that experienced leadership changes and had two full 
months of data before and after the leadership change, thus limiting my countries that I could 
analyze.  Future studies could expand the dataset to more recent dates and therefore increase the 
number of countries that can be included in the leadership change analyses as well as applying a 
statistical analysis to better estimate the effect of the leadership change on COVID-19 policies. 
 Throughout the many analyses presented in this thesis, it does seem that leaders have 
mattered and that their policy choices have affected COVID-19 outcomes.  While the policy 
stringency index reflects policy decisions not just of heads of state but of legislatures and other 
decision-making bodies, the effects of policy stringency on COVID-19 outcomes was robust to 
the democratization of a country, as well as many other demographic, economic, and cultural 
measure I evaluated.  We can learn quite a bit from examining how leaders responded to 
COVID-19 and which methods proved to be more effective than others.  Ultimately, COVID-19 
has shown the world that no country or leader was perfectly prepared to handle a pandemic.  I 
am hopeful that we will learn a great deal about public health preparedness and how leaders 
contribute to or hinder this preparation in the future.  Scientists have frequently noted that they 
are certain there will be another pandemic in the not-too-distant future, and it may be even more 
deadly than COVID-19 (Robbins, 2021).  Thus, it is vital that leaders learn from their successes 
and failures in hopes of preventing and being better prepared to handle the next pandemic. 
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Appendix Table 1: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 2 model with total cases and deaths per million 
as the dependent variables and with stringency index, population, population density, percent of the population aged 































Per Thousand 2.48038 
New Date 
Squared 15.82171 
New Date 15.12288 
 
Appendix Table 2: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 3 model with stringency index as the dependent 
variable and with extreme poverty, Gini coefficient, handwashing facilities, hospital beds per thousand, GDP per 

































Per Thousand 2.74893 
New Date 
Squared 16.23655 
New Date 15.15561 
 
Appendix Table 3: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 3 model with total cases and deaths per million 
as the dependent variables and with stringency index, extreme poverty, Gini coefficient, handwashing facilities, 
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Appendix Table 4: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 4 model with stringency index as the dependent 















Per Thousand 1.36582 
New Date 
Squared 16.43698 
New Date 16.29242 
 
Appendix Table 5: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 4 model with total cases and deaths per million 
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Appendix Table 6: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 4 model with stringency index as the dependent 











Per Thousand 1.35815 
New Date 
Squared 16.00213 
New Date 15.98755 
 
Appendix Table 7: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 4 model with total cases and deaths per million 























Per Thousand 2.47636 
New Date 
Squared 15.75046 
New Date 15.19677 
 
Appendix Table 8: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 4 model with stringency index as the dependent 
variable and with individualism, extreme poverty, Gini coefficient, handwashing facilities, hospital beds per 
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Appendix Table 9: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 4 model with total cases and deaths per million 
as the dependent variables and with stringency index, individualism extreme poverty, Gini coefficient, handwashing 
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Appendix Table 10: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 4 model with stringency index as the 





















New Date 15.89966 
 
Appendix Table 11: Variance inflation factor analysis for the Chapter 4 model with total cases and deaths per 
million as the dependent variables and with stringency index, electoral democracy index, total tests per thousand, 





Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 4.3465 0.0637 4.2217 4.4714 6.24 <0.0001 
Individualism -0.0035 0.0020 -0.0075 0.0004 -1.75 0.0808 
GDP Per 
Capita 
-0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.60 0.5458 
IndGDP -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.02 0.9854 
 
Appendix Table 12: GEE results for stringency index with individualism, GDP per capita, and their product 





Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 7.5374 0.3203 6.9097 8.1651 23.53 <0.0001 
Individualism -0.0171 0.0100 -0.0367 0.0025 -1.71 0.0869 
GDP Per 
Capita 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.08 0.0021 
IndGDP 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.79 0.4280 
 
Appendix Table 13: GEE results for total cases per million with individualism, GDP per capita, and their product 











Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 4.4240 0.4684 3.5059 5.3421 9.44 <0.0001 
Individualism -0.0205 0.0142 -0.0484 0.0074 -1.44 0.1500 
GDP Per 
Capita -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -2.25 0.0247 
IndGDP 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.86 0.2827 
 
Appendix Table 14: GEE results for total deaths per million with individualism, GDP per capita, and their product 





Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 4.0753 0.2587 3.5682 4.5823 15.75 <0.0001 
Individualism -0.0064 0.0051 -0.0164 0.0036 -1.25 0.2098 
Gini 0.0056 0.0062 -0.0066 0.0178 0.89 0.3708 
IndGini 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0004 0.72 0.4731 
 
Appendix Table 15: GEE results for stringency index with individualism, Gini coefficient, and their product 





Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 6.0011 1.2825 3.4876 8.5147 4.68 <0.0001 
Individualism 0.0205 0.0289 -0.0361 0.0771 0.71 0.4782 
Gini 0.0345 0.0347 -0.0335 0.1026 0.99 0.3200 
IndGini -0.0003 0.0009 -0.0020 0.0014 -0.37 0.7132 
 
Appendix Table 16: GEE results for total cases per million with individualism, Gini coefficient, and their product 





Error 95% Confidence Limits Z Pr > ∣Z∣ 
Intercept 3.8947 1.0098 3.2581 4.3980 4.59 <0.0001 
Individualism 0.0944 0.0304 -0.0349 0.1339 0.92 0.3597 
Gini 0.1002 0.0345 -0.0326 0.1478 0.98 0.3386 
IndGini -0.0020 0.0000 -0.0037 0.0002 1.18 0.1916 
 
Appendix Table 17: GEE results for total deaths per million with individualism, Gini coefficient, and their product 
(IndGini) as independent variables. 
